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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
A POLICY GAP ANALYSIS OF CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA (CITES)
IMPLEMENTATION IN NEPAL
by
Yogesh Dongol
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Joel T. Heinen, Major Professor
This study attempts to understand how domestic CITES policies are translated
into action and what effect actions and processes have on compliance. In doing so, this
study provides insight into the implementation and enforcement pitfalls of national
legislation that explain CITES violations in Nepal. Primarily, I used key informants
interviews to learn opinions of experts, and the grounded theory approach for further
qualitative data analysis. In addition, I used Najman’s (1995) policy implementation
analysis framework to explain gaps. Many interrelated variables in the content of the
policy, commitment and capacity of the agencies, the roles of clients and coalitions and
contextual issues were observed. Variables that emerged suggest pitfalls in the regulatory
policy represented by low probability of detection, arrest and punishment. Moreover,
redistributive policies in buffer zones of protected areas are needed into perpetuity to
benefit locals. Also, conservation organizations’ support for building public and political
salience is imperative.
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I. Introduction
Protection of diverse wildlife and their natural habitats maintains ecosystem stability and
resilience from disturbance (Loreau et al. 2001; Hooper et al. 2005; Ives et al. 2007).
Existence of wildlife also provides intrinsic and instrumental values (Ehrlich and Ehrlich
1992). But human induced threats to wildlife are myriad and include climate change,
habitat loss and degradation, invasion of exotic species, and overexploitation (McNelly et
al. 2009; Sutherland et al. 2009; Rands et al. 2010; Butchart et al. 2010). Moreover,
increasing human populations and economic growth, and subsequent over-exploitation of
resources have altered wildlife habitats, and many species have decreased in numbers or
have gone extinct (Rosser & Mainka 2002). Therefore, conservation efforts that consider
rare and endangered species protection are essential because such species are inherently
susceptible to stochastic threats associated with small population sizes (Shaffer 1981).

Unregulated international trade of wildlife and its derivatives is a typical example of over
exploitation that causes direct threats to species survival. For instance, global trade of
high value species is massive (Nijman 2009; McNelly et al. 2009); in particular, legal
wildlife trade in 2005 was reported as $300 billion US (Traffic 2008; Lewis 2009). And
the international illegal wildlife trade was estimated to be in the tens of billions US $
(Wyler and Sheikh 2008). Both have contributed to the extinction of species (Wasser et
al. 2009). Generally, wildlife trade includes live animals and plants in the pet and
horticulture trade, to wildlife meats used for foods, to traditional medicines. For example
horn, pelts, bones, furs, and other body parts of wild animals such as rhinos (Rhinoceros
unicornis), tigers (Panthera tigris), elephants (Elephas maximus) and others are traded in
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international markets. Thus, unregulated legal and more often illegal wildlife trade and
poaching are consider major threats that affect the survival of many species (McNelly et
al. 2009; Nijman 2009). As wildlife trade transcends national borders, trans-boundary
efforts and coordination to minimize, regulate and control such trade from
overexploitation are needed (http://www.cites.org). In response, to address long term
survival of wildlife from international legal and illegal trade, a multilateral environmental
agreement, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES) was developed in 1973 and came into force in 1975.

Multilateral environmental agreements, treaties and conventions are numerous and are
pivotal to address cross border environmental issues (UNEP 2006).

Such accords

promote cooperative action between participating nations. In addition, accords foster
environmentally sustainable behavior through binding or non-binding rules and
regulations (Jacobson and Weiss 1998; Heinen and Chapagain 2002). Despite
proliferation of international environmental accords (Faure and Lefevere 1999; UNEP
2006), national implementation of and compliance with these accords are seen as major
drawbacks influencing overall effectiveness (Weiss and Jacobson 1998). These
drawbacks are primarily because policy implementation is inherently a complex political
process that involves multiple actors operating at multiple levels, each with their specific
interests, goals and strategies (Najam 1995). Moreover, implementation depends on
different factors such as social, cultural, political, and economic characteristics of party
states (Jacobson and Weiss 1998). Given these conditions, possibilities for
noncompliance are enormous, and as rules without compliance are meaningless,
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enforcement measures are inevitable (Akella and Canno 2004; Keane et al. 2008).
Enforcement of domestic legislation on the other hand is complicated because several
factors play key roles in the implementation of decision making, such as the political
environment, public opinion, public advocacy (NGOs and INGOs), political will, and
economic issues in individual nations (Vogel and Kessler 1998; Victor 1998). CITES, a
multilateral environmental agreement, however, has been considered the most successful
conservation agreement on legal grounds (Ong 1998), despite voluminous reporting of
ineffective implementation and compliance to regulate international wildlife trade (Reeve
2006). In particular, CITES violations in the form of illegal trade (both international and
domestic) and discrepancies in reported levels of international wildlife trade in individual
countries are large and growing (Blundell and Mascia 2005; Nijman 2009).

The CITES agreement primarily aims to control international trade of rare and
endangered species and to support sustainable trade of listed species. It is thus both a
conservation and trade agreement. This agreement includes three categories of protection
(Appendix I, Appendix II, and Appendix III) that have listed more than 34,000 species of
wild animals and plants (http://www.cites.org/). The CITES agreement is binding upon
participating nations and requires individual parties to prepare and implement domestic
CITES enabling legislation. Usually, wildlife trade is allowed through a permit system
provided that trade is legal and allowed by CITES provisions. In Nepal, CITES protects
281 species of wildlife including 44 animals and 2 plants on Appendix I, 122 animals and
103 plants on Appendix II and 6 animals and 4 plants on Appendix III
(http://www.cites.org/). To comply with CITES in Nepal, various but discrete laws are
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functional (Heinen and Chapagain 2002; Aryal 2009). Furthermore, the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC), Nepal’s management authority for
CITES, has begun anti-poaching task forces. Similarly, other management authorities,
scientific authorities, and enforcement authorities have been established and are
functional. In addition, several NGOs and epistemic communities and are working in
biodiversity conservation and some NGOs have begun to explore illegal wildlife trade.
Despite different efforts to protect and conserve biodiversity, cases of poaching and trade
that violates CITES are numerous and results are disappointing. In particular, the killing
of rare and endangered wildlife such as rhino, tiger, snow leopard (Panthera uncia) and
other wild animals is widespread and growing (Adhakari 2002; Martin 2004; Yonzon
2005; Baral and Heinen 2006; Bhuju et al. 2009). An earlier study reported lack of
implementation and enforcement of existing legislation and absence of domestic CITES
enabling legislation (Heinen and Chapagain 2002) as a cause of CITES violations in
Nepal. But the factors that affect compliance change overtime (Jacobson and Weiss
1998). More specifically, because the political situation is evolving rapidly as Nepal has
become a Republic and external markets for products have grown in Southeast and East
Asia, especially China, the situation is quite fluid. Also widespread poaching and illegal
trade have been reported within the region (McNelly et al. 2009; Nijman 2009). In
addition, the open border with China and India, facilitating easy access to transit illegal
wildlife products, is of major concern (Yonzon 2005; Bhuju et al. 2009).

Given the complexity of policy implementation in general (Najam 1995) and problems of
CITES implementation in particular (Reeve 2006), my study attempts to understand how
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domestic CITES policies are translated into action and what affect actions and processes
have on compliance. In doing so, this study provides insights into the implementation and
enforcement pitfalls of national legislation that explain CITES violations in Nepal.
Specifically, this study examines extant government policies through key informant
interviews and reviews of documents with the consideration of different factors that
impede CITES implementation. For the study, I used the policy implementation analysis
framework developed by Najam (1995). Particularly, this study focuses on the content of
policy, the nature of the institutional context of implementation, the administrative
capacity of implementers, the commitment of the implementers and the support of clients
and coalitions of policy implementation.

Rather than focusing on specific testable

hypotheses, because of the complexity of topic and issues, this study is exploratory and
generates general knowledge of the problems.

Objectives
The main purpose of the research is to contribute more knowledge about different factors
that influence implementation and enforcement of CITES. My study attempts to describe
the overall effectiveness of CITES as a conservation and trade tool. Essentially it is a
policy gap assessment (Heinen 2010) in CITES implementation. The objectives are:

•

To understand the policy content that guides CITES, including administrative
capacity and the roles and responsibilities of the management and enforcement
agencies within Nepal.
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•

To assess coordination between CITES implementing agencies within Nepal, and
with neighboring nations because cooperation is vital to reduce covert activities
and illegal trade.

•

To understand the role of the contextual environment (political and socioeconomic) that influences policy implementation.

•

To understand the role of the political system, and national and local
organizations with respect to CITES implementation in Nepal.

Research Questions
•

What are the reasons behind the increase in CITES violations in Nepal?

•

What are the major policy gaps that influence implementation and enforcement of
CITES in Nepal?

Nature of the Problem: CITES Violation in Nepal
The CITES violations are enormous and increasing because of social, economic and
political factors (Heinen and Chapagain 2002; Bhuju et al. 2009). For instance, Illegal
trade and poaching of rare and endangered species such as rhino, tiger, common leopard
(Panthera pardus), Asiatic black bear (Ursus thibetanus), otter (Lutra lutra; Lutrogale
perspicillata; Aonyx cinerea), birds and red sandalwood (Pterocarpus Santalinus) is
widespread in Nepal (Yonzon 2005; Aryal 2009). Three major examples of CITES
violation are separately discussed below, particularly poaching and illegal trade of rhino,
tiger and red sandalwood.
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CITES Violation Case 1: Rhino Poaching and Illegal Trade
Historically the Indian rhinoceros was found in most of the South Asia, but now its range
has contracted within Nepal and India with total population of 2575 (Talukdar et al.
2010). In Nepal, rhinoceros inhabit several southern protected areas bordering India.
Currently, about 432 rhinos are distributed in three Nepali protected areas (Chitwan
National Park, Bardia National Park and Suklaphanta Wildlife Reserve). One horn rhino
was upgraded to Vulnerable in the IUCN red list in 2008 from Endangered, because of an
increase in the population in India and Nepal (Milliken et al. 2009). But it is protected
under Appendix I of CITES because of Chinese rhino horn markets. Rhino horns are
particularly traded in China and demand is large and growing. Many people in the region
believe that the horn has medicinal value.

The rhino population fluctuation for past few decades suggested wide-spread poaching
and illegal trade in Nepal and within the region. The population in the 1950s was 800 in
the Chitwan Valley alone, which decreased to 300 in 1959. In the late 1960s, rhino
numbers had decreased to fewer than 100. Gee (1958) in Adhakari (2002) reported that
about 72 and 60 rhinos were killed in 1954 and 1958 respectively. About 35 rhinos were
poached between 1973 and 1991 and a further 28 more were killed in 1992. But with
strong external support and functional anti-poaching units, fewer rhinos were killed from
1992 to 1999. In 1994 anti poaching units arrested 76 poachers which led to an increase
in the rhino population to 612 in 2000 (Adhakari 2002). Beginning in 2000, poaching
increased to such a degree that a total of 372 rhinos in three National Parks were
estimated in 2005 (Martin and Martin 2006; Bhuju et al. 2009) which was primarily

7

because of lack of security (Oli 2005). During the same period more than 88 rhino
poachers were arrested, without any reduction of poaching. Poachers killed 108 rhinos
between 2001 to 2005 (Martin and Martin 2006). Even though Maoist insurgents came
into the peace process after 2005, poachers killed 21 rhinos in 2006 taking opportunities
of the volatile political situation. The year 2007 was relatively calm as only five rhinos
were poached. As a result, the rhino surveys in 2008 claimed a total of 444 rhinos in three
populations in Nepal (Milliken et al. 2009). Since then poachers have killed 36 more
rhinos (DNPWC 2008; personal communication). Many argued that rhino poaching
escalated because of socio-political unrest (insurgency) and disruption of law and order
(Martin 2004; Oli 2005; Milliken et al. 2009). Some reported that livelihoods of local
people, the geographic location of Nepal and the high commercial value of rhino horn
(Ming et al. 2000; Yonzon 2005; Talukdar et al. 2010) were all factors in the increase in
poaching.

CITES Violation Case 2: Tiger Poaching and Illegal Trade
Five subspecies of tiger inhabit thirteen different countries. The global population of all
wild tigers is about 3200 (Chundawat et al. 2010a; Walston et al. 2010) and the Bengal
tiger that inhabits India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and western Myanmar is about 1,532
to 2,351 in number (Chundawat et al. 2010b). Tigers in Nepal are spread in three
different populations in lowland protected areas. The 2008 tiger count estimated 241-304
tigers, which was a decrease from 360-370 total estimated in 2005. In the year
1999/2000, the total estimated tiger number was 340-350 (DNPWC 2007). Although
tiger are listed as Endangered in the IUCN red list, protected under Appendix I of CITES,

8

and protected by the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act in Nepal, illegal
trade is prevalent.

Primarily, tiger skins and bones are traded for medicine, clothing and decorations in
Southeast and East Asia, especially in China. Earlier studies reported that tiger poaching
from Nepal’s protected areas is relatively low compare to the number of tiger products
seized. This threatens tiger conservation in the wild because of Nepal’s role as a transit
for illegal wildlife trade and poaching in India for markets in China (Yonzon 2005). From
2004 to 2007, 26 persons were arrested on charges of tiger poaching with 25-29 tiger
skins and 128.5 kg of bones confiscated (DNPWC 2007; Damania et al. 2008). Further,
DNPWC has reported 19 more poachers were arrested from 7 different cities of Nepal.
The majority of arrests were from Kathmandu, Chitwan (Central Nepal), Bardiya and
Kanchanpur (Far-western Nepal). Total tiger bones confiscated from poachers and traders
from 2004 to 2009 amounts to 167 kg (personal communication).

CITES Violation Case 3: Red Sandalwood Trade
Red sandalwood (Pterocarpus santalinus) is an aromatic tropical hardwood tree which is
endemic to the southern part of India (http://www.iucnredlist.org, Zhou 2004). This
species do not naturally occur in Nepal. Instead, Nepal is a main trade route for the
species from India to China. This species is listed under the Appendix II of the CITES.
Because of its aromatic, favorable coloration and high density wood, this species has
been among the most priced wood for furniture since the Ming dynasty (1368—
1644AD), and was reserved for Imperial use only during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911)
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due to its rarity. Demand for the species remain high in modern China, and has been
increasing since the economic boom started three decades ago. It also is used, to a lesser
degree, as medicine. The high economic value has encouraged illegal trade on this
species.

Illegal trade of red sandalwood provides a unique example of CITES violation in Nepal
and in the region. Nepal, India and China are all party to CITES and are required to
comply with its provision. The CITES provisions necessitate each participating country
to have CITES export, re-export and import permits. Until 2063 BS (2006/2007), District
Forest Offices in Kathmandu and Lalitpur had provided route permission to transport red
sandalwood, and a study reported that 500-600 tons were traded (Mandal et al. 2008).
The Kathmandu District Forest Office alone provided transportation permits for about
450 tons of red sandalwood within 15 months (July 2004 to October 2005). The Nepal
Army for the first time seized 7.8 tons of sandalwood in February 2006. District forest
records showed that 256 tons of red sandalwood have been seized from 15 different
places of the country since then. Of which unclaimed red sandalwood is about 62.5 tons,
and claimed is 193.3 tons. Theft from court premises was about 19 tons. Also 29 tons
were repatriated to India. The remaining total after loss, theft and repatriation was about
208 tons. A total of 55 cases of illegal trade in red sandalwood has been documented by
DFOs. In the latest reported case, traders tried to transport 32 kg of wood in August
2009. The data mentioned that people were illegally exchanging 8.081 tons of confiscated
red sandalwood with utis (Alnus nepalensis). Further, organized gangs took away 11.24
tons of red sandalwood from Lalitpur District Forest Office on November 2007. More
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importantly, the UNEP-WCMC database documented legal trade of red sandalwood from
Nepal to China is about 68 tons (http://www.unep-wcmc.org/citestrade/trade.cfm, April
4, 2011).

Overview of CITES Implementing Policies
In order to implement and comply with CITES, Nepal has adopted different legislative
provisions. Although Nepal does not have specific CITES enabling legislation, existing
laws prohibit any illegal taking, killing and trading of wildlife species. Some relevant
laws that guide CITES implementation are: The National Parks and Wildlife
Conservation Act, 1973, The Forest Act, 1993, The Export Import (Control) Act 1961,
The Customs Act, 2007, The Police Act, 1995 and The Environmental Protection Act
1997.

Regulations of all these acts are functional. Different plans and programs

developed to curb illegal wildlife trade and poaching, and to promote conservation are:
The Wildlife and Plants International Trade Control Act, 2010; the National Conservation
Strategy for Nepal, 1988; the Nepal Environmental Policy and Action Plan, 1993; the
Revised Forestry Sector Policy, 2000; the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy (NBS) and its
Implementation Plan, 2002. The Species Action Plan for Greater One-horned Rhinoceros
Conservation (2006-2011), the Tiger Conservation Action Plan (2007-2012); the South
Asian Wildlife Enforcement Network (SA-WEN), 2007; and the Memorandum of
Understanding with China and India have been signed to control trans-boundary illegal
wildlife trade (Aryal 2009; Bhuju et al. 2009).
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The Wildlife and Plants International Trade Control and Regulation Act, 2010
Domestic CITES enabling legislation called “The Rare (Endangered) Wildlife and Plants
Trade Control Act, 2057 “was drafted in 2002. Heinen and Chapagain (2002) claim that
the 2002 draft CITES bill was robust enough to address many CITES violations. But the
political instability following the Maoist insurgency and the lack of political priority
largely withheld the CITES bill for a decade. However in May 2010, a new CITES bill
was approved by the Nepali Cabinet which further needs endorsement from parliament to
come into law. Surprisingly, the provisions in the current draft CITES bill are quite
different then the bill drafted in 2002 (which never came into force).
Article 3 prohibits trade of endangered (CITES appendix I) species. Sub-section 2 of
Article 3 allows any person or organization to farm or reproduce endangered animals and
plants. Sub-section 3 allows trading of F-1 and subsequent generations of animals and
plants after getting permission from the management authority. Article 6 and 7 discuss
permission requirements from the management authority for transportation of CITES
Appendix II and Appendix III species respectively, for education, scientific and/or
business purpose.

Articles 11 and 12 have punishments provision. Punishment for

infractions involving protected animals include 3 - 7 yrs imprisonment and 500,0001000,000 NRs (approx. $ 7,000 -14,000 US) and, in case of illegal trade of endangered
plants, punishment is 1 - 3 yrs imprisonment and 100,000-500,000 NRs (approx.$ 1,390 6,950 US). Punishments for infractions involving transportation of endangered animals
and plants against the law range from 1 to 3 yrs imprisonment and/or 100,000-500,000
NRs (approx. $ 1400 -7,000 US), to 6 months to 3 yrs imprisonment and 10,000 to
50,000 NRs (approx. $ 140 -700 US). Fines and jail term for involvement in trading
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Appendix II and III animals and plants range from 3 months to 1 year and 10,000 to
50,000 NRs (approx. $ 140 -700 US). Fines and jail terms for accomplices is half of that
for offenders. Article 25 spells out the responsibilities of the CITES Coordination
Committee which involves high ranking officers from different government agencies, but
without representation from the army. Representative from NGOs have also not been
included in the committee. Trust fund and reward provisions are included in Article 26
and 27 respectively. And Article 30 spells out the continuation of the 1973 National
Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act and 1993 Forest Act.

The National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1973 (GoN 1973)
The goals of this act are to protect and manage wildlife and habitats throughout Nepal.
The Government or a concerned agency can declare any area as a national park, wildlife
reserve or conservation area and also may establish buffer zones outside such areas if
necessary. This act prohibits entry inside national parks and wildlife reserves without
permission from an authorized officer. Activities such as hunting, residing, collection of
any product, harming and taking weapons, poisons are prohibited inside National Parks
and Wildlife Reserves. Protected animals (Appendix 1) under this act cannot be hunted
and hunting requires permits for other species. Permission is also required to collect any
specimen for scientific purposes. The law also prohibits trade in trophies without license.
Export and import of wildlife products require permits from the Ministry of Forests and
Soil Conservation. This act provides authority to National park officers to inspect and
search with or without warrant any person in suspicion of violation and allows for
rewards of up to 50,000 NRs (approx. $ 700 US) to any person who furnishes
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information that leads to the arrest of a poacher, or one who has killed or injured
rhinoceros, tiger, elephant, musk deer (Moschus chrysogaster), clouded leopard (Neofelis
nebulosa), snow leopard, and gaur (Bos gaurus). Any person who illegally kills or
injures, sells, purchases or transfers or obtains rhinoceros, tiger, elephant, musk deer,
clouded leopard, snow leopard or gaur, or keeps, purchases or sells rhinoceros horn or
musk-pods or fur of snow leopards as well as trophies of any other protected wildlife,
shall be punished with a fine ranging from fifty to one hundred thousand NRs (approx. $
700 US to $ 1400 US) and/or imprisonment ranging from five years to fifteen years.
Detailed punishments are listed in the Act in case of harm to other animals.

All

investigations of offenses under this Act are conducted by a National Park Officer
(Ranger or Subedar or Non-Gazette Class First) or by an employee at least with the rank
of sub-inspector in the Police force. The Warden has the authority to hear and dispose of
cases under this Act. An appeal may be filed before the Appellate Court against any
decision within 35 days.

The Forest Act, 1993 and the Forest Regulation, 1995 (GoN 1995)
The goals of this act and its regulations are to conserve and manage forests and their
resources. This act manages all forest categories within Nepal, which are: national
forests, government managed forests, protected forests, community forest, leasehold
forests, religious forests and private forests. The 1993 Forest Act provides jurisdiction of
forest officers to implement wildlife laws outside of national parks, reserves and
conservation areas. The Act prohibits activities such as the collection, removal,
utilization, distribution and export of many important listed plants for the protection of
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biodiversity (Appendix 2). The District Forest Officer (DFO) is the adjudicating authority
who shall hear and dispose cases up to NRs 10,000 (approx. $ 140 US), whereas the
district court has the authority to oversee cases greater than NRs 10,000 (approx. $ 140
US) with regard to forest products violations. Offenders are punished with fines
equivalent to the product amount and/or imprisonment up to five years. The DFO is
responsible for investigating poaching and sales of wildlife products and penalize
offenders that fall within its jurisdiction. Rule 13 provides a regulatory mechanism to
export, import and re-export various forest products. Traders, with applications in District
Forest Offices, and subsequent permission (and recommendation to concerned custom
officers) from forest officers, can export any forest product under the regulations.

The Customs Act, 2007 (GoN 2007)
Provisions in the Customs Act, 2007 and Customs Rules, 2007 require submitting a
declaration of goods to be imported and exported. Any export or import of goods requires
permit of transport from a custom office. In case of sending goods from one part of a
foreign country to another part of that foreign country through Nepalese territory, the
owner of goods shall submit an application. Also, a recommendation letter from the
concerned embassy or diplomatic office is required before granting permission, followed
by a declaration of goods and permit of transport. Export smuggling or import smuggling
is considered if traded goods are different or inconsistent as declared, if the trader failed
to submit a declaration or evidence of any goods which are subject to customs duty and if
the trader uses other than the specified route of transport. Such failure to comply with the
Act is subjected to punishment including jail terms and/or fines depending on the
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quantity of traded goods. This Act provides power to customs employees to examine all
exported and imported goods, to search persons or vehicles and to confiscate goods for
laboratory examination. Customs employees are also provided the power to arrest, detain
and release on bail anyone found to have committed any offense under the Act. Customs
employees can exercise the same powers as courts for the purposes of this Act.

The Export and Import (Control) Act 1961 (GoN 1961)
The goal of this act is to prohibit or control export and import of goods, and to meet
several objectives including protection of animals and plants, natural resources, and
implementation of multilateral environmental conventions or bilateral agreements among
others. This act provides the power to prohibit or control exports and imports and to
frame rules to meet objectives. Punishment provisions under section 5 are for those who
trade prohibited or restricted goods and include fines equal to the value of the goods
and/or imprisonment not exceeding one year.

Any person fabricating licenses or

providing false information to obtain a license may be punished with a fine not exceeding
two thousand rupees (approx. $ 28 US). This Act also has a provision to reward any
person giving information pertaining to exported or imported goods in contravention.

The Environmental Protection Act 1997 (GoN 1997)
The goal of this act is to protect and conserve the environment and natural resources. The
Government of Nepal may maintain any natural heritage, rare wildlife, or biological
diversity deemed important for environmental protection in designated areas. Activities
such as sales, hunting, or harming wildlife are prohibited within such areas. No one is
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allowed to research, collect or take any samples of any animal or plant without formal
application and subsequent permission from the concerned agency.

Multiple Actors of Policy Implementation
Different agencies play critical roles implementing and enforcing domestic CITES policy
in Nepal. Arguably, the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder are on an ad hoc
basis. Political parties and leaders particularly have a role in assisting conservation and
management decisions based on extant government rules and regulations. To comply
with CITES, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation is designated
as the management authority for fauna and the Department of Forests is the management
authority for flora. The 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act and its
regulations and the 1993 Forest Act and its regulations have provided roles,
responsibilities and jurisdictions of each agency. In particular, the Warden and DFO are
quasi-judicial bodies where they are required to investigate and give verdicts on
violations. According to CITES, the management agency has the role to issue CITES
permits and certificates. Also, management agencies manage programs and activities, and
conduct regular meeting to achieve goals. The Department of Plant Resource is the
scientific authority for flora in Nepal. Similarly, Nepal’s Natural History Museum is the
scientific authority for fauna. Essentially, scientific authorities have a role to identify
species and products thereof if required. Scientific authorities also update the status of
plants and animals. In particular, they are required to report on the status of species based
on scientific information if sought by a management authority. To enforce the 1973
National Park and Wildlife Conservation Act, the Army forms the largest security force
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in and around national parks and wildlife reserves. Their primary responsibility is to
safeguard wildlife and habitats inside protected areas. About 6,778 army personnel are
involved

in

the

protection

of

9,767

sq.

km

of

12

protected

areas

(http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/env-con.php). In Chitwan National Park alone, more than
900 army are employed. Around 350-525 army personnel reside in 35 different posts
scattered around the park. According to law, they have power to arrest anyone if found
inside National Parks without permission and shoot if offenders try to escape. Similarly,
the 1995 Police Act delegates police the power to curb illegal activities within the
country. Furthermore, the Appellate Court and Supreme Court investigate and give
verdicts in cases where anyone is not satisfied with the judgment of the Warden and
District Forest Officer. Custom Officers primarily investigate and search products that are
intended for export, import or re-export/import. Collaborating agencies such as
international and national non-governmental organizations facilitate and support
government agencies to achieve desired goals. They initiate programs and activities for
protection and conservation of wildlife and also help promote participation of different
stakeholders.

Furthermore, local people and local organizations, user groups and

committees are other grass root stakeholders that affect policy implementation or are
affected by policy.

II. Methodology
Study Area
My study was conducted in Nepal with the focus on analysis of domestic policy
implementation with respect to primary CITES goals and objectives. Nepal is
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economically a least developed country (http://www.worldbank.org.np) and the majority
of conservation funding depends on donor support (Heinen and Chapagian 2002). The
recent decade long civil war and political transition from a monarchy to a democratic
republic (post civil war phase) have greatly diminished social and economic progress.
The current political situation has impacted all sectors including environmental and
wildlife conservation efforts and processes (Oli 2005, Baral and Heinen 2006).
Geographically, Nepal shares an open border with India in the South, East and West, and
a more restricted but largely un-policed border with China in the North. Nepal is 147
181sq km in area and has 20 protected areas covering 23.23 % (including buffer zones) of
the total land area (http://www.dnpwc.gov.np/protected-areas.asp). Nepal became party
of CITES in 1975. Nepal has embraced protection of species and habitats in different
IUCN categories of protected areas (national parks, conservation areas, wildlife reserves,
etc.). Current conservation practices in Nepal are a mixture of both top down and bottom
up approaches. In many protected areas, national army and park staff are deployed for
strict protection of species and habitats inside core areas, where as local people and
conservation organizations are involved in conservation and management of buffer zones
outside protected areas, and of several large conservation areas in the northern part of the
country. Several conservation policies and mechanisms are also in place to protect
wildlife inside and outside of protected areas (Aryal 2009).

Methods
On the basis of Bernard’s (2006) qualitative research method, I used face-to-face
interviews with key informants representing government agencies, non-governmental
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organizations, journalists and local people. Open ended semi structured questionnaires
were used for interviews. In addition, I reviewed wildlife policies and enforcement
records. I used the purposive sampling method for key respondent selection as it is
flexible in allowing the inclusion of new respondents with the progress of interviews and
with information gained from previous interviews (Bernard 2006). Essentially, key
informant interviews are appropriate and effective when intricate problems need to be
unraveled, and when in-depth information cannot be expected from representative survey
respondents (Tremblay 1957). Kumar et al. (1989) claim that the method is useful to
acquire descriptive information for further quantitative study and to give suggestions and
recommendations. In addition, Bradburn et al. (2004) suggest that the method is
particularly beneficial when information cannot be obtained accurately and economically
by any other procedure.

Key Informants Selection
The selection process began with an identification of different management and
collaboration agencies involved in CITES implementation and enforcement in Nepal.
Agencies selected were; the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation, the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC), the Ministry of Home Affairs
(Nepal Police), the Ministry of Finance (Department of Customs), as well as international
NGOs such as International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD),
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) and World Wildlife Federation (WWF-Nepal)
and national NGOs such as the National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC),
Wildlife Conservation Nepal (WCN) and the Nepal Forum for Environmental Journalism

20

(NEFEJ). As adequate consideration of education, knowledge, responsible position and
roles of the respondents is important in selecting key informants for interview (Kumar et
al. 1989), I took suggestions and advice for selection of key informants from highly
reputed wildlife conservation personnel in Nepal (Resources Himalaya Foundation and
WWF-Nepal). In addition, I got inputs from my advisor for key informant selection as he
is highly acquainted with wildlife conservation, and as he completed similar work in
Nepal previously (e.g. Heinen et al. 1995; Heinen and Chapagain 2002). Following the
selection process, key informants in government agencies (management, scientific and
enforcement

agencies)

and

collaborating

agencies

and

institutions

(national

organizations, community organizations, and experts in the field) were contacted via
telephone and email.

Key informants
Sixteen key respondents were interviewed from the above listed agencies and
organizations; Government authority (50%, n=8), experts (12.5%, n=2), organizations
(18.75%, n=3), reporters (12.5%, n=2) and locals (6.25%, n=1). Although multiple key
respondents from each agency could strengthen the results, this study included less than
the expected number of respondents because some respondents were reluctant to
communicate on the topic and some had too little a role or were not closely related to the
issue. Particularly, some respondents from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Nepal Police),
and the Ministry of Finance (Department of Customs) showed an unwillingness to
communicate despite several efforts. I interviewed the army head of Chitwan National
Park about the issues and problems because of their role in wildlife protection and
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curbing illegal activities inside national parks. A respondent from IUCN-Nepal was
intentionally avoided after office visits because that organization does not have employee
expert on CITES implementation.

Although ICIMOD has large interest in and

contribution to biodiversity conservation in Nepal, I did not take consideration of
ICIMOD for interviews because their current role in CITES implementation and
compliance is negligible. Instead, highly acclaimed environmental reporters from two
national dailies (The Himalayan Times and Kantipur Daily) were interviewed because
they have been reporting on wildlife trade issues for the last 10 years. Also I interviewed
the buffer zone president from Jagatpur, Kashara (Chitwan National Park), because local
people’s views on the enforcement of wildlife laws at ground level are important for
protection of wildlife in and around national parks.

Key informants interview
Before any interview, I began with an introduction and background, and research
objectives. I assured respondents about anonymity and confidentiality of responses.
Following that, key resource persons were asked to give their views on the broad topic of
wildlife conservation and their role in biodiversity conservation in Nepal. The question
was aimed at getting an idea about their priorities for conservation. Further, respondents
were asked about the existing political and economic environment of the country with
respect to CITES implementation. Later questions were more specific, especially on
pitfalls of existing CITES policy, and on prevailing wildlife trade and growing CITES
violations. Questions about current functions of government and collaborating agencies
and the role of organized crime were also asked. As an inability to recall issues or a
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tendency to digress from the main point is frequent in key informant interview, and this
was prevalent during my research, respondents were occasionally reminded about major
themes to get the interview back on track. As recording interviews is important for later
analysis, I asked permission to record interviews on audiocassettes; 12 respondents gave
permission.

Document Reviews
To understand obstacles and loopholes in wildlife protection from illegal and legal
international trade, and to suggest effective implementation and compliance, I reviewed
national policies and initiatives. My review was particularly focuses on the National
Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1973, the Forest Act 1993, the Custom Act 2007
The Export and Import (Control) Act 1961, and the Environmental Protection Act, 1997.
Also annual reports published by the DNPWC, the United Nations Environment
Program-World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) database from CITES
websites, and media coverage of wildlife trade issues were reviewed. In addition, I
gathered poachers’ data obtained from district courts (from Chitwan National Park office)
to understand enforcement issues. More specifically, the UNEP-WCMC database was
used to detect probable discrepancies in reported legal trade. Media coverage of illegal
wildlife trades was also reviewed from 2007 to 2010, particularly focusing on the EGH
(Environmental Graduates in Himalaya) weekly publication from three national dailies
(The Kantipur Daily, The Himalayan Times, Gorkhapatra Daily). Poaching data were
mainly focused on rhino, tiger, and red sandalwood because parts of these animals and
plants are highly traded in international markets. Although illegal trade of other species
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such as Asiatic black bear, common leopard, musk deer, otter, orchids (many species),
and yarshagumba (Cordyceps sinensis) have been reported (Aryal 2009), I did not take
these into consideration for my study.

Analysis
All interviews were conducted in Nepali and were transcribed into English for further
coding and analysis. I used the grounded theory approach for qualitative data analysis
developed by Glaser and Strauss, 1976 in (Bernard 2006). On the basis of this approach,
a list of information and comments emerged in an interviews were carefully analyzed
sentence by sentences to discover subthemes. Primarily, I considered repetition of words
and ideas, transitions, similarities and differences in each preceding and following
sentence, and theory related materials to discover subthemes (Ryan and Bernard 2003). I
used Ethnography version 6 qualitative data analysis software for coding qualitative
information to facilitate analysis. Each meaningful sentence was coded to generate
subthemes. Furthermore, I used Najam’s (1995) model of 5Cs protocol of policy
implementation conceptual framework for further categorization and analysis of interrelation of different variables (subthemes) obtained from ethnographic software. The five
Cs represent clusters of variables of policy implementation which were developed based
on the meta-analysis (literature review) of policy formulation and implementation
research. These Cs stands for content of the policy, the nature of the institutional context,
commitment of multiple policy implementing agents, capacity of implementing agents,
and support of clients/coalitions. Najam’s model helps to explain and gives insight about
potential sources of policy implementation gaps. Categories of themes provide broad
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(Endangered) Wildlife and Plants Trade Control Act, 2057 (2002)” was drafted in 2002,
but has been held up in the Cabinet since then.

The majority of key respondents

mentioned that extant laws, especially the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation
Act and the 1993 Forest Act, lack specific roles and responsibilities of CITES
implementing agencies. Some respondents claimed that a clear chain of command is
needed in law to regulate the roles of army and police. In addition, almost 60% stated
that punishment provisions (NRs. 50,000 to 100,000 (approx. $ 700 US to $ 1400 US)
and/or 5-15 years imprisonment) in the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation
Act have drawbacks. They argued that such open provisions have provided adequate
space for personal discretion and engendered inconsistency in judgment. Respondents
stated that the penalty is unjust and lopsided; most convicted and prosecuted front line
poachers are poor and middle men are rarely caught.

In fact, some believe that

punishment through existing legislation is negligible. They claimed that the lower risk of
punishment has encouraged people to get involved in poaching and illegal wildlife trade.
Furthermore, they mentioned that a fixed penalty needs to be reviewed because the 1973
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act consider notorious poachers and traders as
equal to first time offenders. For example, an infamous illegal wildlife trader “Yakche”
confessed that he was involved in more than 20 rhino horns traded, but he just got 5 years
imprisonment and fines. Some also cited that the legislation lacks a performance
appraisal system. In particular, they believed that rewards, incentives, and punishment
with respect to wildlife conservation are essential to reduce the current discrepancy in
judgments. Moreover, a few resource personnel suggested that update of species on the
protected list, clarity in definition, and adequate time provisions for investigation are
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needed to solve some of the basic problems in implementing the Act. In particular, they
mentioned the urgent need to include clouded leopard on the protected list because of
high rate of killing for illegal trade.

Respondent- Expert: “The Army does not listen to the management agency, which is why
the chain of command should be clear and inscribed in law”.

Respondent- Government officer: “Stringency of punishment varies according to judges
because of the open provision in existing law. The open law has provided opportunity for
corruption and personal discretion primarily to favor high profile illegal traders and
poachers”.

Figure 2: Frequency and number of the top five content issues.
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The Administrative Capacity of the Implementers
One of the highly prioritized pitfalls is the lack of resources in implementing agencies.
Almost 75% of respondents claimed that limited staff in management and enforcement is
a deterrent to implementation. Furthermore, nearly 50 % said that funding is too little to
carry out administrative and enforcement activities. All respondents believed that
agencies lack capacity to implement and enforce legislation, and to curb poaching and
illegal wildlife trade.

Almost 90% cited that the DNPWC and the DOF lack

administrative and management capacity and also lack knowledge. In particular, half of
the respondents claimed that national park wardens and the district forest officers do not
have sufficient legal knowledge or background to prosecute offenders in favor of wildlife
protection. In addition, some mentioned that management agencies are highly dependent
on NGOs and lack leadership. The Department of Forests especially lacks leadership in
implementing CITES. Almost half of the respondents were aware of the non functional
role of scientific authorities. They claimed that the diminished role might be because of
lack of funding, under staffing and lack of knowledge. Some inferred that lack of
resources constrains scientific authorities from updating, listing and researching wild
animals and plants. In addition some resource persons claimed that field level police and
customs staff lack awareness and knowledge about the importance of wildlife and cannot
identify wildlife products. In response many suggested adequate training and
sensitization programs are necessary each year, or that such programs should be the part
of their curriculum. Almost 40 % believed that inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the
Army might be because of a lack of incentive to perform better. Some also said that lack
of incentive in other security staff including army, police and national park staff might
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have discouraged patrolling. Although the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife
Conservation Act has reward provisions, respondents said that none of the staff to date
has received a reward. Some respondents mentioned that the enforcement of law is
difficult because the DNPWC and DoF have no role in incentivizing army and police for
their work.

Figure 3: Frequency and number of the top five administrative capacity issues.
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The Commitment of the Implementers
The third prioritized variable was the lack of commitment to protect wildlife from
poaching and illegal trade. The majority of respondents mentioned that the army should
be accountable. They specifically stated that the army needs to take responsibility of
rhino poaching inside national parks. Furthermore, some claimed that the army showed
indifference even when rhino were killed 100 m from their post, and they usually do not
follow management authority directives. Field level staff shirk patrolling when no one is
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there to monitor their activities. Almost 2/3 of the respondents also claimed that the
enforcement personnel including Army, Police and Judges have never considered wildlife
crime as serious, and such crime has never been their priority. In response, they
suggested that an enforcement network and clear chain of command are needed. Many
argued that enforcement personnel, particularly wardens, DFOs and appellate court
judges, lack professional ethics or good moral behavior because their decisions are
inconsistent and biased toward high profile wildlife poachers and traders. The biased
punishment has encouraged killing and trading because of low risk of punishment in all
other cases. All respondents expressed that corruption in judicial agencies is the primary
factor that impedes effective implementation of the legislation. They mentioned that
major implementers involved in corruption are Wardens, DFOs and Judges of Appellate
and Supreme Courts. Likewise, some claimed that district forest officers, police and army
showed an unwillingness to curb illegal red sandalwood trade primarily because of
corruption, political influence and lack of professional ethics. The police, army and
custom officers were heavily involved in abetting red sandalwood trade. Furthermore,
many claimed that the political will and priority to protect and conserve wildlife is
negligible. The most obvious example of low political will is the decade old draft CITES
implementation bill still in bureaucratic processes. Some also cited that some agencies
shirk their responsibilities completely in this area and lack ownership of the issue.
One of the overriding drawbacks that prompts poaching and illegal trade according to all
respondents is the lack of security measures in and around national parks. The army is
primarily responsible to protect wildlife inside national parks and wildlife reserves. The
majority of resource personnel claimed that the army do not adequately patrol potential
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poaching areas. Some argued that the numbers of guard posts are inadequate and the
number of security personal in each post is too little for patrol. Some commented that
foot patrol is important and in reality it is very minimal. Some respondents cited that
anyone can enter national parks without any deterrent (easy access) mainly because of
lack of security. Further, respondents claimed that there are few instances in which the
army has ever caught poachers inside national parks, instead they mentioned that both
army and police personnel have been caught poaching. Several reported that lack of
ownership of the problem and lack of resources might be one of the reasons for rise in
poaching..

Respondent - Expert: “The current rate of poaching is because of lower security
measures and lack of responsibility in enforcement, particularly in the army which
suggests that we should look for alternative security measures”

Respondent- government officer: “If Wildlife Conservation Nepal can get
information and arrest illegal traders with the help of few police and ex-police personnel,
why hasn’t the whole police administration had success, I think it is largely because of
lack of priority and commitment”.

Respondent- government officer: “Despite 70% of the total wildlife budget going
to army, we have not seen any responsibility, accountability and seriousness in the army,
which is very frustrating”
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Figure 4: Frequency and number of the top five Commitment issues
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Almost all respondents opined that lack of coordination, communication and cooperation
between agencies are main reasons that have hindered CITES implementation in Nepal.
The lack of concerted effort was the third most important among all prioritized
implementation gaps. Meetings between and within agencies (scientific, enforcement
and collaborating agencies) are rare.

Respondents including the army chief also

mentioned that they do not share information and intelligence because they do not trust
other agencies. Information and knowledge sharing between DNPWC and enforcement
agencies such as army, police and custom is virtually negligible. Many mentioned that
custom officers do not participate in meetings.

Moreover communication between

stakeholders including NGOs and locals is minimum. In addition, many said that current
trans-boundary meetings are infrequent. Although there are meetings, seminars and
understanding of the need for information sharing and a joint task force to implement and
enforce rules to curb illegal trade exists, continuity is lacking.
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The support of Clients and Coalitions
Some respondents claimed that the role of NGOs is ineffective.

Particularly, they

mentioned that NGOs are primarily money making institutions, and they focus on
meetings and seminars with little benefits for wildlife protection from international trade.
Additionally, about 30% were concerned about Wildlife Conservation Nepal’s (WNC; a
national conservation NGO) role as an enforcement agency without transparency or
information sharing, and against national law. A few also claimed that NGOs seriously
lack field knowledge and do not have long term visions about protecting wildlife from
illegal trade and poaching. Some also mentioned that NGOs and government agencies
were unable to make conservation a priority in the political domain.

Figure 5: Frequency and number of the top five Clients and Coalition issues
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Because of the drawbacks in environmental organizations and management agencies, a
few respondents inferred that buffer zone initiatives which were begun for conservation
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and development have not adequately addressed the key stakeholders’ needs and
aspirations. The respondents opined that benefits from incentive based conservation are
lopsided to a few particular groups, leaders and/or communities. A majority mentioned
that the lack of coalition between locals and street level bureaucrats especially has
hindered the implementation processes. In particular, respondents mentioned that the key
stakeholders lack opportunity or capacity, which has reduced participation and
subsequently reduced trust between implementers and locals. Although many buffer
zone committees and users groups were formed to encourage participation and to build
favorable relationships between implementers and target groups, some claimed that social
capital, and especially the relationship between locals, army and park staff, is
deteriorating. For instance, the news media and some respondents mentioned that army
killed 3 local suspected of poaching in Bardiya National Park on March 2010. Following
the incident, local people, national media, and national and international human rights
organizations protested the crime as a serious human rights violation by the army.
Respondents said that the current conservation approach still is top down, which is highly
regulatory and frequently disregards locals. In particular, a few respondents mentioned
that the current system lacks participatory CITES implementing units. They emphasized
that all actors such as local leaders, user groups and community based organizations
(CBOs) should be included in the design and implementation of policy. Some expressed
that strong participatory networks should be built between locals, users group, user
committees and CBOs against poaching and illegal trade. A few also emphasized that the
contribution of epistemic communities is very rare in providing the needed guidance and
in generating resources to curb illegal wildlife trade. However many considered the
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recent meeting of the South Asian Experts Group on Illegal Wildlife Trade to support
South Asian Wildlife Enforcement Network (SA-WEN) as a positive effort. Besides,
some respondents cited that print and broadcast media have played major roles in
enhancing the importance of wildlife conservation and also highlighting issues
concerning illegal activities by politicians, army, police, customs and judges.

In

particular, some praised the media’s role in reducing red sandalwood trade and bringing
attention to rhino poaching.

The Nature of the Institutional Context
Most respondents agreed that the current political environment in Nepal is a major factor
influencing implementation and enforcement of laws and rules. The political transition
through the Maoist insurgency has affected all aspects of bureaucracy and judicial
decision making. For instance, some mentioned that frequent staff turnover in
government agencies has led to great inefficiencies and has demoralized staff.
Furthermore, government staff are frequently affiliated with a political party which can
make it difficult to take action against some transgressions. Some respondents said that
political instability in the current system has encouraged corruption of judges, police and
customs. In addition, newspapers and a few respondents have mentioned that more than
100 poachers were freed or given amnesty during the political transition period. In some
cases, high level illegal wildlife traders were protected by political leaders.

Many social factors were reported as a deterrent for effective protection of wildlife.
Primarily, almost half of the respondents stated that poaching and illegal trade depends
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on people’s criminal attitudes rather than on poverty and the lack of awareness. However
about 50% of respondents did not rule out poverty and lower awareness of local people as
a cause of current infractions of law. Furthermore, some believed that education of locals
is an important social factor to ensure long term survival of animals and plants in the
wild.

Some others reported that population growth in buffer zone villages, and

unemployment within them, lead to more poaching. Social problems such as rape and
murder cases within national parks, and homelessness of children due to the jailing of
parents have caused a deterioration in the relationship between locals and field level
implementing agencies. Some respondents claimed that external factors such as growing
markets in East and Southeast Asia, especially in China, have fueled poaching and illegal
trade. Wildlife products (rhino horn, tiger parts and red sandalwood) from Nepal and
India are primarily transported to China for traditional medicine. In addition, some
mentioned that high economic value to wildlife poachers and huge economic returns for
traders are reasons of unabated international illegal wildlife trade. Moreover, the
geographic setting of Nepal (porous borders with India and China) was cited as a reason
of growing illicit trade. All respondents cited that organized crime is prevalent and it has
encouraged poaching and illegal trade.

Organized crime was the fourth prioritized

variable among all the issues mentioned by respondents. Respondents suggested that
there are three different tiers of people involved in illegal wildlife trade: local poor people
as front line poachers and accomplices, middle men and high profile traders from urban
areas. They mentioned that most often local poachers and accomplices are caught and
punished, but the majority of middle men and high profile traders avoid punishment. The
majority reported that high profile traders have political and bureaucratic connections
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such as with local leaders, judges, army, and police. In particular, some also claimed that
some politicians, army and police were involved in red sandalwood trade.

Figure 6: Frequency and number of the top five contextual issues
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IV. Discussion
The statement that the lack of domestic enabling legislation is a primary cause of growing
CITES violation in Nepal (Heinen and Chapagain 2002; Aryal 2009; Bhuju et al. 2009) is
partly correct. Numerous other complicating issues were observed that have also
influenced CITES implementation processes in Nepal. Domestic legislation, however, is
imperative because it includes specific goals and objectives and has clear and explicit
methods required for effective policy implementation (Sabatier 1986). Respondents
claimed that extant legislation can adequately address poaching and illegal trade provided
that its implementation and enforcement is effective. My study clearly indicates that two
laws, namely the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act and the 1993 Forest
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Act primarily play critical roles in implementing CITES in Nepal. Other Acts described
above, however, are not less important to achieve CITES goals because they indirectly
help to enforce it. For example, the 1955 Police Act provides authority to police officers
to control all illegal activities, including illegal wildlife trade, within Nepal.

The framework used for analysis is comprehensive as it has recognized top-down and
bottom-up factors that affect policy implementation. Moreover, it is more flexible in its
approach to analyze implementation. All variables that were observed are categorized
into five broad categories that interact with each other to explain implementation and
enforcement gaps of the domestic regulatory policy. In fact, these gaps suggest flaws in
performance of the enforcement chain at various levels of government, and flaws in
incentives based policies.

Enforcement and monitoring of rules is critical when non-compliance thrives (Vogel and
Kessler 1998). More importantly, the probability of detection and arrest, and the
probability of punishment (prosecution and conviction) play important roles in
implementation and enforcement of rules (Akella and Canno 2004; Leader-Williams and
Milner-Gulland 1993), and eventually help to decrease the frequency of offences (Becker
1968; Dobson and Lynes 2008). But the results suggest that the probability of detection
of offenses and punishment if arrested is minimal through existing mechanisms.
Respondents cited gaps in the content of the policies, lack of administrative capacity in
the implementing agencies, negligible commitment of implementers and the influence of
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the socio-economic and political context to explain the low probability of detection and
punishment, and increasing violations of CITES.

Anti-poaching efforts such as frequency and intensity of patrols and informant networks
determine probability of detection (Hilborn et al. 2006). Many studies on elephant and
rhino poaching in Africa have reported that frequency and efficiency of vehicle and foot
patrols remarkably reduced poaching and illegal trade (Leader-Williams and MilnerGulland 1993; Hilborn et al. 2006). Further, Adhakari (2002) reported robust informant
networks in Nepal have helped to reduce rhino poaching. Back then, the informant’s
network was large with collaboration between DNPWC, DoF, local people and
occasional armed support from Nepal Army, and the chain of command was clear.
According to the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, army personnel
and park staff are entrusted to protect wildlife in and around national parks. Likewise, the
Department of Forests (DoF) has a role in protecting wildlife outside protected areas per
the 1993 Forest Act. But current anti-poaching efforts, particularly patrols inside national
parks, are sorely lacking, and informants’ networks outside national parks are now
minimal (Poudyal et al. 2005; Bhuju et al. 2009). Mainly, the army and national park
staff shirk patrolling, and existing security posts are inadequate (Baral and Heinen 2006;
Bhuju et al. 2009). In addition, numerous other factors lower detection, such as the
absence of clear specific rules and responsibilities and hierarchies of implementing
agencies (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier 1986) in extant legislation. Najam
(1995) argues that a clear chain of command is important when multi agency and
multilayered working groups are involved, because specific roles and clear chains of
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command delegate power to management agencies to provide clear directives to
subordinate agencies, and also help to build support among agencies (Traffic North
America 2009).

Many times enforcement agencies disregard conservation agencies

because they lack political weight. Likewise, Heinen and Chapagain (2002) reported
jurisdictional confusion between the DNPWC and the DoF because of lack of clarity in
current law, which might lower the detection rate of violations (Akella and Canno 2004).
Lower accountability or responsibility of staff also influences detection probability
(Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993; Najam 1995). In Nepal, the lack of
accountability of government staff was categorically claimed as a major deterrent to
effective CITES implementation. Willingness to carry out the specified job is critical for
effective implementation of legislation, and this, in fact, is minimal in the army.
Protecting wildlife has never been a high priority of higher level Army staff. According
to the Resources Himalaya Watchdog newsletter, over 30 Nepal army soldiers are
arrested every year for involvement in poaching or smuggling wildlife (Dangol and
Paudyal 2008). More recently, the chief warden of Bardiya National Park claimed that
out of 76 people arrested for poaching and illegal trade for bush meat, 50% were police
and 25% were army personnel (Ghimire and Bhatta 2010).

Other than hindering the

detection probability, a low commitment on the part of the Army and Police increases
corruption and bribery, and reduces information sharing and coordinated efforts. The low
commitment of enforcement personnel may be because of lack of a performance
appraisal system in current law. Likewise, limited staff and budget shortage in the army
and the national park department might have influenced anti-poaching efforts in and
around national parks. Many studies report that availability of adequate budgets for
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monitoring in general increases species protection in protected areas (Hilborn et al. 2006;
Walker 2009). Earlier studies in Nepal have also suggested that low staff numbers and
lack of funding in enforcement agencies increases poaching and illegal trade (Heinen and
Chapagain 2002; Aryal 2009; Bhuju et al. 2009).

The probability of arrest of potential violators and offenders was meager, as suggested by
low degrees of patrolling and minimal informant networks. Factors such as capacity and
commitment of enforcement agencies and public support also play key roles. However
the low arrest rate for illegal trade of red sandalwood was particularly related to lower
commitments of enforcement agencies caused largely by corruption in management and
enforcement personnel. Many national newspapers have reported incidents of
involvement of traders, enforcement personnel (Army, Police, and Custom) and political
leaders in illegal red sandalwood trade.

Increased probability of punishment - that is prosecution and conviction - and subsequent
reduction in offenses primarily depends on penalties inscribed in legislation (Keane et al.
2008). Although two existing laws have stringent punishment including fines and/or
prison sentences, such provisions have had minimal impacts on restricting violations of
CITES. Results suggest several implementation gaps. The personal discretion of judges
because of the open penalty provisions in law is a major issue that decreases the
likelihood of punishment. The open provision has prompted unfair judgments and high
levels of corruption in the judicial system. Akella and Canno (2004) claim that unjust
enforcement reduces compliance, engenders corruption and also demoralizes well
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intentioned enforcement staff. Furthermore, fixed penalties in the 1973 National Park
and Wildlife Conservation Act have encouraged offences because benefits from illegal
trade often exceed costs of offenses (Akella and Canno 2004). Working in Zambia,
Milner-Gulland and Leaader-Williams (1992) reported that penalties that vary with the
degree of violation are more effective. In addition, a performance appraisal system is
lacking or non functional in extant legislation, which might be a reason that has
engendered high inconsistency in prosecution. Also, lack of legal knowledge among
wardens and district forest officers may have the effect of reducing punishment because
prosecution and conviction depend on backgrounds in the court proceedings.

For instance, poacher data (April 2008-April 2009) from Chitwan National Park depicts
the low probability of punishment. According to the data, out of 87 total convicted
offenders, especially in rhino and tiger cases, 35 % were not currently in custody. Earlier
research also mentioned that nearly 60% of poachers escaped punishment (Bhuju et al.
2009). In addition, many high profile illegal traders were less punished than local
accomplices. For instance, the most infamous illegal trader “Yakche” got a short jail
sentence even though he confessed and was convicted of involvement in more than 20
rhino horns trade. The jail term of a notorious middle man “Gokul Pant”, was reduced
from an appellate court decision. Given the release of both the high profile trader and the
middle man, and no dearth of locals willing to participate in poaching, and a favorable
political environment, more killings of rhino and tiger are expected.
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In addition, enforcement of rules also depends on communication, coordination and
cooperation between agency personnel, prosecutors, and judges (Akella and Canno 2004)
and between NGOs.

In Nepal, information and intelligence sharing is too little and

coordination meetings are too infrequent. Heinen and Chapagain (2002) suggested that
the frequency of coordination meetings between agencies should be inscribed into law for
better enforcement results. In particular, communication, coordination and cooperation
increase trust, which is important for maintaining efforts. More importantly, sharing of
information decreases judicial confusion, increases procedural efficiency among
agencies, and helps to build strong cases against offenders (Akella and Canno 2004). As
multi enforcement agency personnel are involved, communication and coordination are
critical for effective implementation. Constant communication and concerted efforts
between the international community, and a higher political priority for conservation
could also help in enforcement by generating funding and capacity building. Moreover,
international meetings and MOUs exist among Nepal, India and China, but continuity of
the activities is lacking which leads to lower trans-boundary cooperation.

Although effective implementation of domestic policy depends on the political
environment including public support, preference of politicians, and the role of NGOs
(Vogel and Kessler 1998), influences of political environment was not highly prioritized
compared to enforcement issues by key informants. However, considerable numbers of
respondents mentioned the importance of the political environment to explain growing
levels of illegal international trade and poaching.

Particularly, local awareness and

educational opportunities, employment, and economic benefits to locals increases
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favorable conservation attitudes required for effectiveness of community based
conservation programs (Mehta and Heinen 2001) and can help to reduce poaching
activates (Lewis et al. 1990). In addition, sound conservation attitudes are imperative to
build public participation and coalitions for better conservation (Wells and Brandon
1993). Specifically, participation and collective action increase communication and build
trust to manage common benefits from wildlife resources and subsequently reinforce
social capital (Pretty 2003). Pretty and Smith (2004) argue that social capital components
such as relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchange, common rule, norms and
sanctions, and connectedness of groups are important to shape individual and group
behaviors for positive biodiversity outcomes. But the lack of above mentioned benefits
that were reported during interviews infer poorer conservation attitudes of stakeholders,
which may describe one cause of the increase in rhino poaching (Martin and Martin
2006). Moreover, current conservation policies in buffer zones of protected areas, which
were heralded to bring more favorable conservation attitudes, are still top-down and such
is represented by low social capital and lack of ownership among people. Unfavorable
conservation attitudes that arise because of negligible benefits from community based
conservation (Bookbinder et al. 1998; Wells and McShane 2004) may lower information
and intelligence sharing about potential violators, and may reduce local participation in
meetings and workshops or support in conservation initiatives. Vogel and Kessler (1998)
mentioned that the lack of public support in India, Japan and Italy affected each
government’s ability to comply with CITES.
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Despite significant contributions of different national and international conservation
organizations, respondents have cited some drawback in the working modality of
organizations with regard to growing CITES implementation in Nepal.

Essentially,

NGOs have a role to play in building public and political salience and support through
advocacy and dissemination of information (Kraft and Vig 2009), generating funding for
capacity development, supporting research, and functioning as watchdogs for
conservation and protection of wildlife (Vogel and Kessler 1998). But undertaking of
such roles by organizations is minimal in Nepal. Instead, conflict between NGOs,
management agencies and enforcement agencies is prevalent. Good relationships between
and within organizations and agencies are needed. The lack of concerted efforts and
among NGOs and agencies has led to the decade long hold up of CITES bill (The
(Endangered) Wildlife and Plant Trade Control Act, 2002. Some NGOs have played a
role in arresting poachers, but many key informants were concerned about that work
because of minimal information sharing and lack of transparency.

The major contextual issue that influences implementation of policy is the political
situation of a country and preference of elected politicians (Vogel and Kessler 1998). In
Nepal, according to the respondents, CITES implementation has been impacted by
political instability of the country, lack of politicians’ priority of wildlife issues, low
willingness of politicians to protect wildlife, political influence in bureaucratic and
judicial decisions, and the changes in the political system. Extreme political instability is
prevalent in Nepal because of its recently ended civil war. The above situation suggests
diminished enforcement of laws and regulations and reduced security decreased the
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capacity of implementing agencies because of lack of resources, bad governance, and less
support among target groups. Political instability and long transition periods particularly
engenders weak judicial efficiency and political patronage that promotes corruption and
non-compliance of rules and regulations (Damania et al. 2004). In particular, Martin et
al. (2009) opines that the massive rhino poaching after 2000 was because of political
upheaval and disruption of law and order. Enforcement of law and order in politically
unstable conditions is disrupted because of shifting priorities of enforcement agencies.
For instance, In Nepal, during the insurgency, national park army guards were reduced by
70%, from 112 posts to 34 posts (Baral and Heinen 2006). In Chitwan National Park
alone, 25 out of 32 army posts were withdrawn, which largely influenced park security
leading to a large amount of rhinos poaching (Adhakari 2002).

In states of war, there are many possibilities of non-compliance: forged permits, misuse
of stolen permits and even genuine permit, which have been used to cover shipments of
illegally acquired or traded specimens (Fuller et al. 2009). Furthermore, external
resources in support of conservation decrease (funding, technical trainings, meetings) as
many donors withdraw their activities for security reasons (Vogel and Kessler 1998,
Hamilton et al. 2000). Political unrest also decreases the sources of income in the country
because of reduced economic activities; such as decreases in tourism, lower agricultural
productivity, and fewer development activities. Besides lack of monitoring and laxity in
punishment, political instability encourages trans-boundary involvement of illegal traders
as was evident in Nepal. Taking advantage of the situation, traders had used Nepal as a
transit route for illegal wildlife trade with China and India (Yonzon 2005) and this still
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exists. On top of that, the civil war affected trans-boundary efforts to curb illegal wildlife
trade, as coordination, cooperation and communication between countries (Nepal, India
and China) decreased (Oli 2005; Baral and Heinen 2006).

The increase in CITES violations can also be predicted because of the high economic
value and growing markets for wildlife products including parts of rhinos, tigers and red
sandalwood. As the benefit is extremely high, organized gangs have used the porous
borders to trade illegal wildlife products. In particular, Ming et al. (2000) reported that
about 10% of wild animal products used in Tibetan and Chinese tradition medicine come
from Nepal and India, suggesting huge illegal trade in the region. Traffic (2007)
published that Chinese consumption of protected species is increasing and further
reported that Chinese medicinal trade in many part of the world is growing at an annual
rate of 10 percent. A survey in southern Chinese markets reveled that about half of the
restaurants sold wild animal products. Of 56 species for sale, 17 were protected under
CITES (Traffic 2009). Surprisingly, consumers are diverse and Chinese traditional
medicine is hugely profitable business in Asia, Europe and North America (Ming et al.
2000; Traffic 2007). More importantly, the purchasing power of Chinese people is
growing which bodes badly for important endangered wild animals, particularly tiger and
rhinos. Wild tiger poaching can be expected to continue and increase for two main
reasons. First, Chinese people prefer wild tiger products over farmed tiger products
because of supposedly better analgesic effects. Secondly, farming tiger is 250 times more
expensive comparing to poaching in India and Nepal (Dinerstein et al. 2007).

In

addition, poaching and illegal wildlife trade is expected to increase because people move
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between borders with little limitation. The arrest of poachers of different nationalities in
Kathmandu (90% of traders are from the Tibetan community) with large volumes of
wildlife products, suggests that Nepal is both a transit and source of trade in wildlife
products (Yonzon 2005).

V. Conclusion
My study shows that the CITES implementation process in Nepal, involving multiple
actors at multiple levels, has been severely impacted by gaps in policy design, drawbacks
in implementing agencies and contextual issues of implementation. Numerous flaws that
hinder implementation suggest problems in performance of the enforcement chain and
low public and political support. These conditions infer CITES violations, as indicated
by illegal international trade of protected species, is large and growing.

Primarily, the role of the army and national park staff in detecting illegal activities and
arresting potential violators inside parks is negligible because of the lack of security
which is prompted by a lack of responsibility, accountability and resources. Also, the role
of police and customs in arresting offenders has been limited by little knowledge of
wildlife products and the low priority of the issue. Moreover, punishment of high profile
traders, if arrested, is low compared to front line poachers, which is at least partly a result
of corruption. Lack of knowledge and priority among wardens, DFOs and Appellate and
Supreme Court judges have also lowered the probability of punishment. In addition, the
lack of specific roles and responsibilities, a clear hierarchy and open punishment
provisions have decreased the probability of detection and punishment. The arrangement
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needed to encourage communication, coordination and cooperation among stakeholders
to improve enforcement is truly lacking. My study found that the probability of
enforcement and monitoring of the enforcement of law is too little to curb existing rates
of CITES violation. Many redistributive polices such as community based conservation
programs in buffer zones of national parks have been implemented to improve
conservation attitudes to safeguard wildlife. But socio economic benefits and social
capital necessary to enhance favorable conservation attitudes and behavior is low. NGOs
lag in building public and political salience and support. Advocacy and dissemination of
information regarding illegal wildlife trade issues is inadequate. In addition, political
instability increases corruption and influences bureaucratic and judicial decision making.
Many external factors such as high market prices and demand in East Asia and porous
borders to smuggle illegal goods have also contributed the growth of illegal trade.
Given the circumstances, any future policy that aims to address illegal wildlife trade
should focus on increasing the performance of the enforcement chain. Essentially, policy
should opt for strengthening each factor within the chain of enforcement including the
probability of detection, arrest, persecution and conviction. At present, stringency of law
is essential because of the presence of organized crime, porous borders, poor governance,
and lack of adequate resources. However, prioritization among the factors needs further
empirical study. In addition, policy should include a performance appraisal system for
each implementing agency to improve commitment. The (MIST) integrated spatial
management information system (Walston et al. 2010) that was mentioned during
interviews could be beneficial to enhance the probability of detection, as it helps to
monitor patrolling. To increase the probability of arrest outside protected areas, the role
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of police and customs should be encouraged with adequate training programs. The role
of customs especially is important in management and enforcement of CITES because of
the large numbers of field level staff throughout the country. Also, community based
informant networks need to be encouraged for better information and intelligence
sharing. Although prevailing laws have provisions to reduce poaching and illegal wildlife
trade, the system lacks clear responsibilities, chains of command, and performance
appraisals. Therefore, these issues should be inscribed into new legislation or amended in
existing legislation.

Non-governmental organizations play important roles in the public and political domain
to help build consensus, salience and support of issues through information sharing and
advocacy. Such organizations also help to build new knowledge by funding and
functioning as watchdogs in support of conservation. Therefore, the role of NGOs should
be promoted. In addition, as people’s perception of illegal wildlife trade depends on how
media frame the problem, the role of media needs to be enhanced. More importantly, as
places near protected areas have many poor and illiterate people who can be lured into
illicit activities, socio economic development, awareness and education programs are
essential to build positive conservation attitudes and behavior. Finally, as many policy
implementation gaps mentioned above suggest the intricate problems associated with
wildlife governance, further empirical study is needed.
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Appendices
Appendix 7: Protected Animals under NPWC Act, 1973
Mammals
SCIENTIFIC NAME

ENGLISH NAME

LOCAL NAME

1.

Macaca assamensis

Assamese monkey

Assamis rato bandar

2.

Manis pentadactyla

Indian pangolin

Salak

3.

Caprolagus hispidus

Hispid hare

Hispid kharayo

4.

Canis lupus

Wolf

Bwanso

5.

Ursus arctos

Himalayan Bear

Himali rato bhalu

6.

Ailurus fulgens

Red panda

Habre

7.

Prionodon pardicolor

Spotted linsang

Silu

8.

Felis bengalensia

Leopard cat

Chari bagh

9.

Felis lynx

Lynx

Lynx

10.

Neofelis nebulosa

Clouded leopard

Dwanse chituwa

11.

Panthera tigris

Tiger

Bagh

12.

Panthere uncia

Snow leopard

Hinu chituwa

13.

Elephas maximus

Asiatic elephant

Hatti

14.

Rhiniceros unicornis

Rhinoceros

Gainda

15.

Sus salvanius

Pygmi hog

Pudke Bandel

16.

Moschus moschiferos

Musk deer

Kasturi mirga

17.

Cervus duvauceli

Swamp deer

Barhasingha

18.

Bos gaurus

Gaur

Gauri gai

19.

Bos grunniens

Wild yak

Yak

S.N
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20.

Bubalus bubalis

Wild buffalo

Arna

21.

Ovis ammon

Great tibetan sheep

Nayan

22.

Pantholops hodgsoni

Tibetan antilope

Chiru

23.

Antilope cervicapra

Black buck

Krisnasar

24.

Tetraceros quadricornis

Four horned antilope

Chauka

25.

Hyaena hyaena

Striped hynae

Hundar

26.

Platanista gangetica

Gangetic dolphin

Shons

Birds
S.N

SCIENTIFIC NAME

ENGLISH NAME

LOCAL NAME

1.

Catreus wallichii

Chir pheasant

Kalij

2.

Lophophorus impeyanus

Impeyan pheasant

Danfe

3.

Tragopan satyra

Crimson horned pheasant

Monal

4.

Ciconia ciconia

White stork

Seto sarus

5.

Eupodotis bengalensis

Bengal florican

Khar majur

6.

Sypheotides indica

Lesser florican

Sano khar majur

7.

Grus grus

Sarus crane

Sarus

8.

Buceros bicornis

Giant hornbill

Thulo dhanesh

9.

Ciconia nigra

Black stork

Kalo sarus

Reptiles
S.N

SCIENTIFIC NAME

ENGLISH NAME

LOCAL NAME

1.

Gavialis gangeticus

Ghariyal

Gharial gohi

2.

Python spp.

Python

Ajingar

60

3.

Varanus flavescens

Monitor lizard

Sun gohoro

Appendix 8: Plants banned under Forest Act, 1993 and Forest Regulation, 1995
Plants banned for collection, use, sale and distribution, transport and export
SN

SCIENTIFIC NAME

1

Dactylorhiza hatagirea

ENGLISH NAME

LOCAL NAME
Panchaule,

Hattajadi,

Salampanja
2

Juglans regia

Walnut (bark)

Okhar bokra

Plants banned for export except processed with permission of Department of Forest
SN

SCIENTIFIC NAME

ENGLISH NAME

LOCAL NAME

1

Abies spectabilis

Himalayan fir, Silver fir

Gobresalla,

Talispatra,

Thingresalla
2

Cinnamomum glaucescens

Sugandhakokila, Malagedi

3

Cordyceps sinensis

Caterpillar fungus

Yarchagumba, Jeevanbuti

4

Nardostachys grandiflora

Spikenard

Jatamansi, Bhulte, Balchhar

5

Parmelia nepalensis

Lichen

Jhyau

6

Rauvolfia serpentina

Indian snake root

Sarpagandha

7

Rock exudate

Rock exudates

Silajit

8

Taxus baccata

Himalayan yew

Lauth salla, Talispatra

9

Valeriana jatamansii

Himalayan valerian

Sugandhabal, Tagar

Trees banned for transport, export and felling for commercial purpose
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SN

SCIENTIFIC NAME

ENGLISH NAME

LOCAL NAME

1

Acacia catechu

Cutch tree

Khayar

2

Bombax ceiba

Silk Cotton tree

Simal

3

Dalbergia latifolia

Rose Wood

Satisal

4

Juglans regia

Walnut

Okhar

5

Michelia champaca

Orange champaca

Champ

6

Pterocarpus marsupium

Indian Kino Tree

Bijayasaal

7

Shorea robusta

Sal

Sal

Plant banned for export except recommendation of Department of Plant Resource as the valid
species and availability of the species by DoF
SN

SCIENTIFIC NAME

ENGLISH NAME

LOCAL NAME

1

Neopicrorhiza scrophulariiflora

Picrorhiza

Katuki, Kutaki
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